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This essay seeks to identify and assess the general shift in Russian foreign policy thinking
during Vladimir Putin’s presidency. The main thesis of this essay is that a general shift in
Russian foreign policy had occurred during Putin’s presidency owing to the rise in Statist
thinking. To substantiate the thesis, the author uses the State of the Nation addresses of
Boris Yeltsin and Vladimir Putin to make a comparative analysis of the presidents’ foreign
policy approaches. As demonstrated in the essay, the Russian foreign policy had experi-
enced a dramatic inﬂux of state power during Vladimir Putin’s presidency, which resulted
in the relative quantitative and qualitative reduction of cooperative initiatives between the
United States and Russia.
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The beginning of the twenty ﬁrst century marked the
dawn of a new era in US–Russian relations. The end of the
Cold War in the late 1980s and the ensuing warm relations
between the former adversaries brought the decades of
geo-political, military, economic confrontation and of the
competition for the spheres of inﬂuence across the globe to
an end. The collapse of the Soviet empire resulted in a form
of an alliance between Moscow andWashington in the ﬁrst
half of the 1990s, when president Yeltsin was the head of
the Russian state, which gradually transformed into fragile
interstate relations ﬁlled with mutual suspicion, mistrust
and political confrontation after Putin succeeded Yeltsin as
the new Russian leader. During the Soviet era the-PaciﬁcResearchCenter,Hanyconfrontation and the inability to bridge the gap between
the superpowers could be understood in the broader
context of the ideological struggle. In the mid-1990s,
however, when Russia’s leadership vowed to support the
ideals of democracy and market economy and when the
Western world was no longer concerned about the spread
of communism in Europe, other factors came into play.
Rising nationalism and internal political pressure engen-
dered by deteriorating economic conditions, widespread
social discontent and a threat posed to state security by the
secessionist movements in the Caucasus brought Putin to
power and allowed him to accumulate a substantial
amount of political might.
Given such adverse domestic conditions, the demand
for a strong leadership in Russia rose andmainly because of
that, president Boris Yeltsin hand-picked Vladimir Putin to
lead the country out of chaos and disorder. Yeltsin assumed
that Putin’s character and determination would be critical
in strengthening Russia’s economic and political position in
the world and also in assuring the continuity of the coun-
try’s political and foreign policy course. However, Putin’s
response to major global political processes differed fromangUniversity. ProducedanddistributedbyElsevier Limited.All rights reserved.
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presidency. Putin hoped that a change of a political strategy
would provoke the growth of the country’s welfare,
enhance security and revive the global power image that
was largely lost by the preceding leadership as the former
superpower transformed into a new nation-state. Increas-
ingly, Putin maintained a hard-line stance on many
domestic and foreign policy issues, which resulted in the
renewal of political tensions between US and Russia,
reminiscent of the confrontation during the Cold War era.
Even today, he continues to wield a substantial amount of
political power largely because he never managed to lose
the support of power elites. Over the years of his rule, Putin
structured the entire political system in Russia according to
his own belief of how to reach progress and stability for all.
Obviously, the centralization of executive power was the
major step taken by Putin toward authoritarianism and,
simultaneously, the distancing of Russia from the West.
Why did Putin decide to change the Russian foreign policy
course and was it a product of his personal motives or of
a much broader negotiation process among the political
and business elites? While answering this question is not
a simple task, I will try to bring to light some aspects of
Putin’s leadership which I thought were the engine of this
change.
Although a change of a pro-Western Russian foreign
policy could be observed as early as 1993 when Boris
Yeltsin was in power; the arrival of Putin marked the
beginning point of a new political era for the Russian
society. Moreover, following Putin’s election, the ofﬁcial
Russian foreign policy thinking experienced a dramatic
shift. Undoubtedly, Putin came to power when Russia’s
domestic economic and political conditions differed dras-
tically from those during Yeltsin’s presidency. Such a policy
shift could be seen as a normal reaction of any adminis-
tration to various circumstances. Indeed, many scholars
contend that there was no fundamental change of Russian
foreign policy from Yeltsin to Putin. They believe that
Putin’s foreign policy was in large part a continuation of the
course that was conceived during the late-Yeltsin period.
Mankoff (2009, p. 4) argues that “the assertive, narrowly
self-interested foreign policy that has characterized Russia
during the Putin–Medvedev years is merely the culmina-
tion of a process that began over a decade earlier, during
the presidency of Boris Yeltsin, at a time when the bulk of
the Russian elite came to recognize that integration with
the West and its institutions was neither possible nor
desirable, at least in the short run” (Mankoff, 2009).
However, to understand the distinction between Yeltsin’s
and Putin’s foreign policy, one would need to look deeply
into Russia’s ofﬁcial standing on various issues of global and
domestic importance as expressed in the State of the
Nation addresses and a political behavior of both
presidents.
The State of the Nation address is the central annual
speech made by the Russian president to highlight the
country’s main economic and political challenges, objec-
tives, and priorities. It also reﬂects and reinforces the
general political orientation of the leadership. The rhetoric
of the Russian president in the annual address sets the tone
for the country’s foreign policy during the years of anyadministration in power. Critical international and
domestic issues are addressed in the speech to express the
ofﬁcial standing of the leadership and inform any inter-
ested parties, including other global powers. I will use
a number of case studies to support the main argument of
the essay – namely, the US National Missile Defense, NATO
expansion initiatives, the situation in Kosovo, the war in
Chechnya and, more broadly, US reactions to the Russian
policies in the Caucasus, as well as US–Russian relations in
the context of the global campaign against terrorism. By
comparing the annual State of the Nation addresses of
Putin and Yeltsin, I will identify the shift in the ofﬁcial
positions toward these aspects of foreign policy and assess
the ramiﬁcations of the statements. The purpose of this
essay is not to formulate a substantive critique of Putin’s or
Yeltsin’s approach to foreign affairs but rather to trace the
distinction and provide an explanation of policy actions of
both presidents under various circumstances.
When Putin succeeded Yeltsin as President in 2000, the
Russian foreign policy toward the United States began to
shift – from what looked like a soft confrontation and
sporadic economic and political partnership during Yelt-
sin’s era to an explicitly cold, aggressive and highly prag-
matic diplomacy, accompanied bymilitary demonstrations,
strong rhetoric and other conspicuous aspects that char-
acterized Putin’s foreign policy. This change was mainly
aroused by his personal perceptions of Russia’s new polit-
ical and military standing in the world, his strong patriotic
and nationalist convictions. In order to illuminate this
dramatic shift in Russia’s foreign policy, I will draw
a comparison of two time periods – the foreign policy
trends from 1992 to 1999 and from 2000 to 2007 under
Yeltsin’s leadership and under Putin’s leadership,
respectively.
The Russian policy toward the United States under Putin
wasmainly concerned about the advancing US plan to build
a National Missile Defense system against the so-called
“rogue” states and the abrogation of the Anti-Ballistic
Missile Treaty. Russia perceived the plan to install the
missile shield as being targeted against it. As a result, Putin
had sparked an international campaign against these US
initiatives. The missile shield was seen as a threat to the
strategic parity, the global balance of power, and, more
importantly, to Russia’s strategic and geo-political interests
in Europe. The US plan “wonderfully ﬁts the overall picture
of the American global anti-missile defense, which,
according to our analysis – just look at the map – is being
deployed along Russia’s perimeter, and also China’s, inci-
dentally” (Putin, 2007a). US–Russian relations were further
strained when GeorgeW. Bush succeeded Bill Clinton as US
President in January 2001mainly because hemade the ﬁnal
decision to implement the project rapidly. Although, Pres-
ident George W. Bush had sought President Putin’s acqui-
escence to his administration’s plans, in December 2001,
Bush announced his intention for the United States to
withdraw from the ABM Treaty in six months without
waiting for Moscow’s approval.
The unilateral withdrawal of the United States from the
arms control treaty and the drive of US policymakers to
expand their military presence and to pursue their security
objectives in the areas of traditional Russian inﬂuence in
S. Kasymov / Journal of Eurasian Studies 3 (2012) 58–6860Europe and across the globe, had sparked a new cycle of
political contention, when Russia began to rise as an energy
superpower and an important world actor willing to be
reckoned with on matters related to global security and
peace. Certainly, sky-rocketing oil prices, high dependence
of foreign markets, primarily European, on Russia’s energy
resources, and an economic boom accounted for the form
of the tone with which Putin asserted the country’s posi-
tion on the global political arena. More importantly,
however, this assertiveness mirrored a highly substantial
agreement among the Russian political and public circles
on the nature of Russia’s new role in the modern world,
inspired by the patriotic convictions of the former Russian
President Vladimir Putin. Herspring and Rutland (2003a, p.
259) explain the nationalist sentiments in Russia as “if
there is an “ism” that drives Putin, it is nationalism –
nationalism built not on ethnic, cultural, or spiritual values,
but on the centrality of state power, which in Putin’s case
embraces a deep-seated desire to restore Russia’s former
greatness” (Herspring and Rutland, 2003a). Putin claims
that “patriotism is a source of courage, staunchness, and
strength of our people. If we lose patriotism and national
pride and dignity, which are connected with it, we will lose
ourselves as a nation capable of great achievements”
(Quoted in Herspring and Rutland, 2003a; p. 259).
During the early 1990s, the situation was drastically
different, when Russia – dependent on foreign, mainly US
economic assistance and investments sought to collaborate
with theWest on amultitude of issues, from liberal reforms
to disarmament and space program to economic trans-
formations. US–Russian relations were often described as
apprenticeship rather than rivalry of any form during the
early years of Yeltsin’s presidency. The Russian society then
quickly became embittered by the economic reforms
initiated by a group of liberal reformists headed by Yegor
Gaidar and soon after that, Russia’s leadership started to
move toward bilateral partnership and reduce the depen-
dence on Western political expertise and guidance. Prior to
Putin, the Russian foreign policy thinking had already been
inﬂuenced by Primakov and other hard-line policymakers.
Consequently, Putin’s approach seemed not such a drastic
change of state policies toward the West. The radically
transformative domestic policies and a lean toward an
authoritarian rule were suggestive of Putin’s will for Russia
to appear as a strong and competitive player in the eyes of
the Western community. While the contrast between
Yeltsin’s and Putin’s domestic policies is hard to overlook,
the correlation between domestic and foreign policies in
Russia is probably more intimate than in many other
countries. Russian foreign policy is in large part reﬂective of
the internal political processes as much as it is a reaction to
international developments and events that touch upon
the short- and long-term security interests of Russia.
2. The revival of statism in Russia
For centuries, Russia’s foreign policy has been shaped by
the developments in the West, how the status of Russia as
a global power was evolving in that light, and how its
national strategic interests weremet by key external actors.
In the aftermath of the demise of the Soviet empire, thenew leadership and the elites embarked on a quest for
a new sense of national identity. Initially, a pro-Western
vision of national identity and foreign policy was
espoused by the Russian leadership, which was consistent
with their perception of the world at large. Subsequently,
following the economic decline, the new Russian world-
view derived primarily from the perception of its economic
backwardness relative to steadily growing Western econ-
omies and the ideological unity amongmost of theWestern
countries relative to a political disorder, consecutive
ﬁnancial crises, and the disintegration trends that domi-
nated the Russian domestic arena.
Statists, along with Westernists and Civilizationists,
constitute the threedistinct traditions, or schools, of Russian
foreign policy thinking. Tsygankov (2006a, p. 4) maintains
that these schools “sought to preserveRussia’s international
choices in ways consistent with the schools’ historically
established images of the country and the outside world”
(Tsygankov, 2006a). Westernists tend to embrace Western
modes of thinking, stressing Russia’s similarities with the
West. Westernists emphasize Russia’s alignment along the
Western-orientated political course. They view Russia as
a Western power that should strive to acquire the status of
a modern, liberal-democratic global power. Westernists are
also labeled as Atlanticists and International institutional-
ists. Their mode of thinking was popular from 1987 to 1990
and was captured in such phrases as “global problems” and
“interdependence”. Andrey Kozyrev was probably the
foremost defender of Russia’s orientation toward the West.
Along with other reformists of the Yeltsin era, including
Anatoly Chubais and Yegor Gaidar, hewas later criticized for
having conceded the Russian position to the West on
a multitude of foreign policy issues. In light of the political
challenges brought about in the mid-1990s, the Russian
political establishment was compelled to reassess the
country’s ofﬁcial foreign policy thinking and expel the
Westernists from the political arena.
Faced with such new challenges as military conﬂicts in
the Russian periphery andwithin Russia (Chechnya), the
semihostile attitudes of some of the former Soviet
republics toward Russia, NATO expansion, and the ﬂare-
up in the Balkans, those advocating international insti-
tutionalism were unable to offer a conceptual perspec-
tive on how the country should meet them. Their grand
strategy involving the development of a deep, multi-
sided partnership with the West has turned out to be
ﬂawed. As a result, international institutionalism has
been challenged by other schools of foreign policy
thought (Tsygankov, 1997; p. 250).
Civilizationists, on the other hand, have always seen
Russia’s distinctive role in the world through the prism of
a cultural opposition between Russia and the West. They
assert that Russia is not a Western power. Early-Soviet
Civilizationists challenged the West in a most direct
fashion, defending the doctrine of the world revolution.
They are also labeled as Revolutionary expansionists. Other
Soviet thinkers, however, advocated a peaceful coexistence
and limited cooperation with the “capitalist world”. Yet
another version of Civilizationist thinking is the so-called
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both European and Asian cultures. Eurasianists believe that
Russia has a unique destiny. According to this paradigm,
Russia is a Eurasian power that lies between the Western
and Eastern civilizations and has its own – a “third” way of
development. Eurasianism stresses Russia’s dominance in
Central Asia and the Caucasus. Alexander Dugin, a neo-
Eurasianist, contends that Russia and the West – repre-
sented by the US, are destined to collide because of their
uncompromising values (Dugin, 1997). According to Dugin
(1997), “In principle, Eurasia and our space, the heartland
Russia, remain the staging area of a new anti-bourgeois,
anti-American revolution.” According to his 1997 book,
The Basics of Geopolitics, “The new Eurasian empire will be
constructed on the fundamental principle of the common
enemy: the rejection of Atlanticism, strategic control of the
USA, and the refusal to allow liberal values to dominate us.
This common civilizational impulse will be the basis of
a political and strategic union” (Dugin, 1997). Generally
speaking, Civilizationists have always viewed Russian
values as different from those of theWest. However, Dmitry
Shlapentokh believes that it remains unclear whether Putin
belongs to the so-called “Eurasianist camp” of policy-
makers and ideologues (Shlapentokh, 2005).
Putin’s presidency marked a consistent political course
toward the enhancement of the bilateral and multilateral
partnership with the Central Asian republics. Additionally,
Putin took steps to consolidate the position of the Russian
government in the Caucasus. Early in his tenure as presi-
dent, Putin even proclaimed that Russian foreign policy is
prepared to make a “decisive turn” (Putin, 2000a) toward
the Asia-Paciﬁc region. Indeed, Putin made consistent
efforts to restore the Russian geo-political and economic
presence in the Asia-Paciﬁc region. The relations with
China and India as well as other countries of the Asia-
Paciﬁc region were promising mainly due to economic
partnership and numerous arms trade agreements, all of
which formed the backbone of a wider Russian strategy to
weaken the US position in the region and prepare the
groundwork for the so-called “multipolar triangle,” and
further a “quadrangle” – with Brazil to be included –
despite the fact that the US ties with China and India were
also solid as never before. However, it would be wrong to
view Putin as the leader guided entirely by the Eurasianist
paradigm. The reform of state power institutions was seen
by Putin as the best solution to Russia’s looming political
and economic crisis when he succeeded Yeltsin as Russia’s
new leader. Putin exhibited an undeniable conformity to
a Statist paradigm though his commitment to an Eura-
sianist conception could justify the necessity to counter-
poise the Western inﬂuence across the world.
Statists have always sought to preserve and increase the
role of the state and its ability to sustain the social, political
and international order. Statist way of thinking is conducive
to the consolidation of state control. More importantly,
Statism is reinforced and accompanied by a strong national
idea. For Statists, the West is seen as a threat to a strong
state because Western interests are thought to weaken
statehood in Russia. Statists, by their nature, tend to
prevent and undermine any Western involvement and
inﬂuence in Russia as well as across the globe. One of thecentral preexisting factors leading to Statism is the pres-
ence or perception of the external threat to the security of
the state. Plans to expand the US military presence in
Europe and in the former Soviet territories sparked a new
wave of Statist thinking because of the perception of
immediate threat to Russia’s state interests, among other
factors. As will be demonstrated in this essay, Vladimir
Putin’s main political vision of Russia’s place in the world
coincided with the Statist paradigm, particularly if Russia’s
national security and cultural identity initiatives under
Putin are scrutinized. Putin’s views were intimately tied to
a Civilizationist perspective of Russia’s role in the modern
world combined with a renewed belief in state institutions.
In other words, according to Putin, Russia is neither
a Western nor an Eastern power. Russia is a global power in
its own right whose security and integrity are the ultimate
goals of state leadership.
Yeltsin sought Russia’s integration in the Western
community even though he never challenged Russia’s
distinctive role in theworld. Likewise, Putin sought Russia’s
integration in the global economic and political affairs, yet
through the increased reliance on power structures and
with the grown ambition to create a new Russian state
identity. The attempts to negotiate the accession of Russia
to the World Trade Organization have led to nothing since
Putin’s reforms were aimed at the consolidation of state
power institutions, the erosion of democratic mechanisms,
and a markedly grown state involvement in the economy –
particularly, in the resource extraction sector contradicted
the norms of the WTO. Putin believed that the state plays
a key role in Russia’s resurgence as a global power;
whereas, all other considerations, including the signiﬁ-
cance of a thriving civil society and democratic institutions,
are essentially incompatible with the Russian milieu. Putin
took steps to reduce the involvement of private capital in
the economy, particularly in the industrial and resource
extraction sectors, thereby appropriating the major source
of state income. These tendencies signiﬁcantly alienated
Russia from the West during Putin’s presidency and the
political contention between Russia and US culminated in
a 2008 war between Georgia and Russia over South Ossetia
and Abkhazia.
A reliance on power structures, military force, and
coercive state power while excluding civil actors from the
political process makes Statists diametrically opposed to
Westernists. Putin eliminated the presence of foreign NGOs
and civil society actors on the Russian soil who were active
in promoting governance reforms, a free society, and crisis
management. Many opposition groups and government
critics were silenced during the ﬁrst few years of his
presidency. In the aftermath of Putin’s reforms, the exec-
utive and legislative branches of power merged – that is,
many government ofﬁcials were simultaneously members
of the ruling party – the United Russia, headed by Putin,
which bears a close resemblance to the Communist Party’s
dominance of the political landscape during the Soviet era.
Opposition parties and prominent anti-establishment
ﬁgures were effectively marginalized in the years of
Putin’s rule so as to achieve state-centrist objectives. State-
centrism also characterized the foreign policy course under
then President Putin, which led to a discord with the US
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National Missile Defense system in Central and Eastern
Europe.
3. US national missile defense
Plans to install a National Missile Defense system date
back to late 1950s when the US leadership sought to
develop and implement a defensive system against Soviet
ballistic missiles. The current national missile defense
initiative is the latest version of a long series of systems
under development. It is intended to protect the United
States against a limited nuclear attack by a “rogue” nation
like North Korea or Iran.
Although Yeltsinwas objecting to US plans to deploy the
elements of the National Missile Defense system in the
formerWarsawpact countries, theﬁnancial aid packageand
the membership in the G-7, a group of economically
advanced democracies, promised in exchange for imple-
menting liberal and economic reforms helped to tone down
Russian criticism. The signingof theComprehensiveNuclear
Test Ban Treaty in 1996 and the promise of advancing the
ratiﬁcation of the Chemical Weapons Convention were
indicative of the relative success and of the ongoing coop-
eration between US and Russia during Yeltsin’s rule.
Following Yeltsin’s resignation in December 1999, Putin
became theActingPresidentof Russia. Soonafter that, a new
National Security Concept was signed into law which reaf-
ﬁrmed Russia’s strong commitment of the previous 1997
Concept to the principle of nuclear deterrence and the
possible preventive ﬁrst use of nuclear weapons. The
Concept reiterated the leading role of nuclear weapons in
protecting state integrity and security. Whereas the 1997
National Security Concept had reserved the right to
anuclear strike “in case anarmedaggression creates a threat
to the very existence of the Russian Federation as an inde-
pendent sovereign state (National Security Concept of
Russian Federation, 1997),” Putin’s version of the docu-
ment contained an alteration of the wording: “the use of all
forces andmeans at its disposal, including nuclearweapons,
in order to repel armed aggression against itself or its allies,
when no other means are deemed possible to prevent the
liquidation of Russia as a party to international relations
(National Security Concept of Russian Federation, 2000).”
Putin’s 2000 military and foreign policy doctrine
referred to NATO as an impediment to securing the Russian
strategic interests, yet it also highlighted the difference
between Europe and US and underscored the importance
of the “multipolar” global order. The signing of the SORT
treaty in May 2002 by Putin and George W. Bush opened
the door to the reduction in the number of nuclear
warheads to 1700–2200 in Russia and US over the next ten
years (Cirincione & Wolfsthal, 2002). Unlike the START
treaties that were signed prior to and following Putin’s
presidency, the SORT treaty was later criticized on
a number of aspects, including the absence of proper
veriﬁcation provisions that ensured the implementation of
the terms of the treaty; no guarantees prohibiting the
redeployment of warheads after the treaty expires in 2011
and other weaknesses related to implementation mecha-
nisms (Cirincione & Wolfsthal, 2002).Interestingly, Yeltsin expressed his opposition to the US
initiative to install the components of the National Missile
Defense system in Central and Eastern Europe, yet he never
used the language of threat so as to inﬂuence the decision
of the countries involved and to delay or disrupt their plans.
Both Yeltsin and Putin consistently stressed the importance
of respecting Russia’s national strategic interests by inter-
national partners, yet Putin went further to threaten tar-
geting the former Warsaw Pact allies by the Russian
offensive strategic nuclear forces in an effort to prevent the
installation of the system. In an interviewwith newspapers
from the Group of Eight (G8) industrialized nations, Putin
stressed that: “If the US nuclear potential extends across
the European territory, wewill get new targets in Europe. It
will then be up to our military experts to identify which
targets will be aimed by ballistic missiles and which ones
will be aimed by cruise missiles” (Blomﬁeld, 2007).
We have taken several other steps required by the
Adapted Conventional Armed Forces Treaty in Europe
(ACAF). But what have we seen in response? Eastern
Europe is receiving new weapons, two new military
bases are being set up in Romania and in Bulgaria, and
there are two new missile launch areas – a radar in the
Czech republic and missile systems in Poland. And we
are asking ourselves a question: what is going on?
Russia is disarming unilaterally. But if we disarm
unilaterally then we would like to see our partners be
willing to do the same thing in Europe. On the contrary,
Europe is being pumped full of new weapons systems.
And of course we cannot help, but be concerned (Putin,
2007b).
A perception of external threat posed by the expansion
of US defensive missile systems in Europe led Putin to
pursue a counter-strategy aimed at the revival of the mili-
tary, forging new alternative alliances, demonstratively
testing new missiles, resuming strategic bomber ﬂights in
close proximity to NATO’s bases, and conducting war
games in concert with anti-Western countries. Putin also
took steps to restore relations with Germany and France,
offering them an alternative Russian–European missile
shield to counter US proposals. However, European NATO
member countries felt reluctant to accept Putin’s proposal,
which excluded the US ally. Subsequently, US–Russian
relations improved and the concept of multipolarity was
mentioned less frequently. During his speech at theMunich
Conference on Security Policy in 2007, Putin said:
why is this being done, why are our American partners
so insistent about implementing the missile defense
plans in Europe, if they are obviously not needed for
protection against the Iranian or North Korean missiles?
It is well knownwhere North Korea is located and what
the range of their missiles needs to be to reach Europe. It
is clear that it is not against them or us, because
everyone knows that Russia does not intend to attack
anyone. Why is this being done? Perhaps, to provoke
our response and to prevent our integration into Europe.
Missiles with a range of about ﬁve to eight thousand
kilometers that really pose a threat to Europe do not
exist in any of the so-called “problem” countries. Any
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rocket to American territory through Western Europe
obviously contradicts the laws of ballistics. As we say in
Russia, it would be like using the right hand to reach the
left ear (Putin, 2007c).
The international war against terrorism improved the
Russian relations with NATO and in May 2002 the NATO-
Russia Council was formed in which Russia became one
of the twenty members. Its goal was to promote coopera-
tion in ﬁghting terrorism, crisis management, arms control,
rescue operations and emergency situations, to name a few.
In January 1992, Boris Yeltsin also called for a global missile
defense system that could be developed and operated by
both Russia and US. Such a system could be based on
modiﬁed Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) technology. In
essence, Yeltsin’s offer contradicted his previous state-
ments reafﬁrming Russia’s compliance with the Anti-
ballistic Missile Treaty which prohibits extensive missile
defense systems. The proposal was left unrealized because
of the pessimism prevalent among US policymakers with
regard to a joint anti-ballistic missile defense system with
Russia. Bobo Lo (2002) describes the “overall of Russian
foreign policy during the Yeltsin period as ‘ad hoc’ and
‘reactive”. He argues that “policymakers consistently
sought to give the impression of strategic vision and long-
term thinking. But the competition between sectional
interests within the elite had anaesthetizing effect on
policy. Decision-making was driven by lowest common
denominator principles, based on the avoidance of risk. The
outcome, largely accidental, was a ‘pragmatism by default’
instead of the consensus sought by the regime” (Lo, 2002).
Russian foreign policy priorities in the Yeltsin period were
geared to accommodate the need to reinforce statehood to
the expectation that was prevalent among the American
decision-makers to move forward with the realization of
governance reforms in Russia and implement the disar-
mament initiatives according to the agree-upon timeline. It
is clear that Yeltsin aspired to see Russia become a part of
the world community and especially the West, and coop-
erating with the US leadership on a broad range of issues
was deemed as the most effective way of achieving that.
Putin’s political course effectively decelerated the
progression of the state along that vector. His rhetoric
related to US missile defense initiatives manifests a more
deterministic approach to foreign affairs – all the more so
as Russian national interests were believed and claimed to
be directly affected by the US defense initiatives in Europe.
Putin perceived the US plan to install the elements of NMD
in Europe as being designed to protect primarily against
Russia’s offensive nuclear potential, not the Iranian or
North Korean missiles as the ofﬁcials from the Bush
administration had stated. Whereas his opposition to
Western security initiatives can be seen as a response to the
rejection of his proposals to deploy a joint missile defense
system with both Europe and US, more importantly, state-
centrism and the objectives set forth by a new military
doctrine appeared to be the main vehicle of the shift in
Russia’s foreign policy thinking and the relations with the
United States on the question of NMD deployment in
Central and Eastern Europe.4. NATO expansion
After the collapse of the communist system in Russia,
deep structural transformations, liberal and economic
reforms were encouraged by the West and reinforced by
the pledges to provide a substantial foreign aid. A great
inﬂuence upon President Yeltsin’s foreign policy strategies
was exerted by the so-called group of Westernists who, in
large part, steered the country toward the accommodation
of Western interests and urged the fulﬁllment of the
international ﬁnancial institutions’ demands in exchange
for large inﬂows of aid. In 1991, in an effort to demonstrate
a pro-Western policy orientation, the Yeltsin administra-
tion even sent a letter to NATO expressing a strong interest
in the membership and the willingness to move toward
a full-scale partnership. “His letter did receive some
publicity in the media, but suspicion lingered in the West
about the permanency and even about the viability of
Yeltsin’s democratic reforms in Russia” (Felkay, 2002a; p.
178).
By not encouraging Russia to become a member, the
West missed an excellent opportunity to strengthen
Russia’s nascent democracy. An acceptance, or at least
a positive response, would have given an initial boost to
Yeltsin’s pro-Western foreign policies, a much-needed
new identity to the ﬂoundering Russian military, and
would have effectively countered Yeltsin’s nationalist
and Communist critics (Felkay, 2002a; p. 178).
Felkay (2002a, p. 178) maintains that “despite NATO’s
reluctance to embrace Yeltsin’s Russia, the Yeltsin–Kozyrev
team pushed on toward integrating Russia with the rest of
Europe and building a friendly relationship with the United
States.” Yeltsin realized that he had tomake the post-Soviet
political and economic transformations attractive to the
American decision-makers, and especially President Clin-
ton, because Russia’s integration into the rest of the
developed world was of foremost importance. Yeltsin’s
foreign policy was largely driven by pragmatism and
adaptability toWestern approaches in decision- and policy-
making was central to the realization of those foreign
policy objectives. It was deemed as being conducive to
strengthening Russia’s overall position as a global player
rather than adversary. Bobo Lo (2002, p. 8) suggests that
“during the Yeltsin period, America represented the single
greatest external inﬂuence on Russian foreign policy,
whether in relations with the IMF, in terms of the strategic
disarmament agenda, in determining the level of Russian
interest in regional and global issues, or in shaping elite
perception of national identity.”
The rhetoric was much stronger during Putin’s leader-
ship over what he perceived and presented as the encir-
clement of Russia’s geo-political domains by the US-led
NATO forces. In a similar fashion, Putin expressed an
interest in Russia’s membership in NATO. However,
subsequently, no further actions were undertaken to secure
Russia’s inclusion in the European community. To make
matters worse, Putin took steps to emphasize the depen-
dence of most European countries on Russia’s energy
resources as well as their economic vulnerability – partic-
ularly, when he gave direct orders to cut the supplies of
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of winter. This had a detrimental effect on the relations
with other Western leaders. In his 2000 State of the Nation
address, Putin stressed the need to alleviate Russia’s
dependence on foreign aid: “it not only relates to our
national pride, though it is also important. The question is
more dramatic and of much greater signiﬁcance. It is
whether or not we can survive as a nation and civilization
when our well-being again and again depends on inter-
national loans and the favor of world economic leaders”
(Putin, 2002a).
At the 2007 Munich Conference devoted to global
security issues, President Putin criticized the US leadership
for conducting a unilateral foreign policy, for pursuing its
national interests while ignoring those of other countries,
both major and minor. He described the US diplomacy as
using an “almost uncontained hyper use of force – military
force – in international relations, a force that is plunging
the world into an abyss of permanent conﬂicts” (Putin,
2007d). He also expressed Russia’s concern when he
pointed to the “so-called ﬂexible frontline American bases
with up to ﬁve thousand men in each. It turns out that
NATO has put its frontline bases on our borders” (Putin,
2007d). In a 2007 speech commemorating the 62nd anni-
versary of the Nazi defeat in World War II, Putin tacitly
compared US foreign policy to that of the Third Reich. He
stated that: “We do not have the right to forget the causes
of any war, which must be sought in the mistakes and
errors of peacetime. In our time, these threats are not
diminishing. They are only transforming, changing their
appearance. In these new threats, as during the time of the
Third Reich, are the same contempt for human life and the
same claims of exceptionality and diktat in the world”
(Quoted in Kramer, 2007).
In his 1997 speech, Yeltsin reiterated his opposition to
NATO expansion plans by stating that “they aim to
contradict the Russian security interests and are conducive
to fracturing the European political space. The signiﬁcance
of existing European-wide political organizations will
diminish. Never before has anyone been able to create an
effective security system in Europe without Russia or
against it” (Yeltsin, 1997). He further proposed to increase
the dialog in an effort to ease tensions.
This year Russia’s diplomacy sought to implement those
foreign policy objectives outlined in the previous
addresses, namely, to create favorable external condi-
tions for the continuation of domestic reforms, for
building and maintaining genuinely equal relationships
with the leading countries of the world, corresponding
to the status and potential of Russia. Our aim is to
defend our national interests not by resorting to
confrontation, but by building the foundation for future
stability and cooperation in international relations.
Russian foreign policy is aimed to construct the system
of international relations based on themultipolar peace,
devoid of the dominance by a single center of force
(Yeltsin, 1997).
It is important to mention that the agreed-upon ﬁnan-
cial aid package did not eliminate, but helped to tone down
Russian criticism of NATO’s eastward expansion duringYeltsin’s rule. The American assurances given on the ABM
Treaty also helped. The signing of the Comprehensive
Nuclear Test Ban Treaty and the promise of advancing the
ratiﬁcation of the Chemical Weapons Convention were
gestures of ongoing cooperation between the two nations,
despite their disagreement on NATO expansion. The
American side had made another concession to appease
Yeltsin, by announcing that the United States would
support Russia’s full participation in future meetings of the
Group of Seven (G-7).
In contrast to Yeltsin’s diplomatic gestures and his
manifested willingness to cooperate despite the unilateral
engagement of NATO in Kosovo, Putin pursued a consistent
and strictly pro-Russian policy course on matters related to
global security and peace. Putin was more cautious about
the NATO expansion plans. The 2008 war between Georgia
and Russia is a good case in point. The Russian military
campaign against Georgian forces exacerbated the tense
relations between US and Russia. For the US, Georgia was
a geo-strategic partner and an ally waiting for the
membership in NATO and in the European Union. The
accession of Georgia represented a salient opportunity to
implement the NATO eastern expansion objective.
However, Western leaders were reluctant to aggravate
tensions with Russia by acceding Georgia into NATO.
Rather, this demonstrates that at that time – maintaining
peaceful and cooperative relations with Russia was more
important for the West than expanding the NATO presence
eastward. Nevertheless, that does not diminish Russia’s
concern about a threat posed by the military bloc.
5. Kosovo
The conﬂict in Kosovo vividly demonstrates that the
shift in Russian foreign policy thinking toward Statism was
manifested not only in the statements made by the presi-
dents, but also in the actual actions of the Russian
government under Putin’s protégé, President Medvedev.
The conﬂict in Georgia in 2008 over the two annexed
republics of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, when the invasion
by the Russian military forces was justiﬁed as being in line
with the actions of the West in Kosovo and the US-backed
declaration of independence of the breakaway region is
illustrative of the Putin administration’s disregard for
international legal norms and of the commitment to use
military force in advancing a new national idea. In Yeltsin’s
era, however, there was a tendency to defer the making of
difﬁcult decisions. Moscowwas prone or at least attempted
to ignore problems related to Yugoslavia in an effort to
postpone a decision on how to respond toMilosevic and his
barbaric actions in Yugoslavia (Herspring and Rutland,
2003b; p. 227). As a result of such policy, it appeared that
Moscow approved the Western policy in the Balkans.
Yeltsin was compelled to invent a new type of relationship
with the US seeking a greater economic support and
a solution to the accumulating domestic political pressure
in light of the painstaking transition process and the
successive ﬁnancial crises that had nearly thrown the
Russian economy into an abyss of chaos. At that time, the
US was the sole superpower and as many people in the
Russian elites asserted – amajor source of donor aid. In that
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emphasis on strengthening the US–Russian ties. However,
his consistent health problems, inability to handle the
domestic processes, the peculiarity of his personality, and,
at times, lack of assertiveness also created additional
impediments to forming a solid foreign policy course.
In the wake of his rule, Putin came to power when
Russian foreign policy was weak, inconsistent and ineffec-
tive. It was then that a new course began to form. Putin’s
foreign policy appeared increasingly solid, goal-oriented,
consistent and pragmatic. During his visit to Kosovo in
2001 Putin said that: “the international community, which
set up a protectorate in Kosovo at the end of the civil war in
1999, must act to implement a UN Security Council reso-
lution guaranteeing the rights of minority Serbs in the
province of Kosovo and the integrity of Yugoslavia” (Quoted
in Putin, 2001). Putin reiterated that the long-standing
Russian ties with the Serbian people constitute the foun-
dation of the bilateral relations. Russia viewed NATO
intervention in Kosovo as being the cause of the Albanian
nationalism in the region.
In his 2000 State of the Nation address, Putin said that:
The Cold War is in the past, yet even today we have to
overcome its hard consequence, including the attempts
to infringe the rights of sovereign states under the
umbrella of the so-called humanitarian interventions
and the difﬁculty of ﬁnding a common language when it
comes to resolving the issues of regional and interna-
tional threats (Putin, 2000b).
The situation in Kosovo, which Yeltsin failed to handle
appropriately, sparked a new wave of anti-Western senti-
ments and helped Putin to consolidate his political plat-
form and to engage in the wide-scale military operations in
the North Caucasus. Yeltsin said that: “Russia has a number
of extreme measures in store, but we decided not to use
them so far. We are above that. On the moral level we are
superior to the Americans. The NATO aggression against
Yugoslavia is a very big mistake made by the American
diplomacy and by Clinton, and they will be held account-
able” (Quoted in Felkay, 2002b; pp. 88–120). Subsequently,
Yeltsin appealed to the leaders of the Contact Group on
Yugoslavia and called for the Security Council meeting to
end the bombing and to continue the search for peace – an
effort that did not yield results. However, this demonstrates
Yeltsin’s higher commitment to peace and political dialog.
He strove to prevent unilateral military interventions and
sought a greater involvement of the UN in the resolution of
the crisis. In his State of the Nation speech, Yeltsin pro-
claimed: “I will do everything to put an end to military
actions in Yugoslavia, but Russia has already made its
choice – it will not allow itself to be drawn into the conﬂict.
We are trying to avoid another global split” (Quoted in
Felkay, 2002b; pp. 88–120).
6. Chechnya
Disagreements between US and Russia over the reso-
lution of the conﬂict in Chechnya became commonplace
after Putin was elected President of Russia. He perceived
and presented Chechen rebels as a threat not only to theRussian society and its territorial integrity, but also to the
civilization at large, which he predominantly associated
with the West, so as to achieve a greater international
support for the operations in the Caucasus. In his April
2002 State of the Nation address, Putin said that “in the
aftermath of the September 11 attacks on New York and
Washington, many people realized that the Cold War is
over and that there are different threats and there is
another war with international terrorism. This does not
require additional evidence and equally applies to Russia”
(Putin, 2002a). The ﬁrst wave of terrorist attacks in Mos-
cow and the second Chechen campaign that followed
them boosted his ratings substantially before the presi-
dential elections in 2000 and gave him conﬁdence in
promoting a centralized governance system across the
nation.
The events of 2004 proved a major challenge for Putin,
after two civilian airplanes were downed and more than
a thousand schoolchildren and teachers were taken
hostage in Beslan, North Ossetia, both of which resulted in
hundreds of casualties. The attacks seemed to have been
spreading across the whole region and people felt
increasingly less secure from the threat. The initial reaction
was hardly in line with the pragmatic Western-oriented
course. In his ﬁrst statement, President Putin admitted
that Russia lacked sufﬁcient and adequate defense, but also
relegated partial responsibility for the Beslan incident to
some unspeciﬁed external forces that worked to under-
mine the Russian inﬂuence in the region and to instigate
secessionist sentiments and movements. In a vague refer-
ence to the West, he said that “some want to tear off a big
chunk of our country and others are helping them. They are
helping them in the belief that Russia, as one of the greatest
nuclear powers of the world, still poses a threat to them
and, therefore, this threat has to be eliminated. Terrorism is
their only tool” (Tsygankov, 2006b; p. 145).
However, US–Russian relations improved in the wake of
the terrorist attacks in New York andWashington and after
the two presidents met in 2001. Whereas certain Russian
policymakers had expressed their willingness to support
the USA, given the concessions on NATO enlargement
initiatives were made, President Putin immediately
endorsed the US plan to launch a global war on terrorism,
which was seen in line with Russia’s own domestic
campaign to suppress insurgencies and secessionism. The
events of September 11, 2001 presented a perfect oppor-
tunity for Moscow to build a solid foundation for the
domestic policies. “Fighting terrorism has been the argu-
ment used by Russia to combat rebel groups in Chechnya
and it builds on a strong national consensus created by the
bombings of civilian apartment complexes in Russia in
1999” (Wallensteen, 2007; p. 217). The obvious reason was
that Putin already saw Russia as ﬁghting such a war in
Chechnya and that the resumption of this war in 1999 had
greatly contributed to his accession to power. Russia thus
supported the US-led campaign to oust the Taliban regime
and to eliminate the Al-Qaida network in Afghanistan. As
a result, Putin reluctantly accepted the US plan to deploy
military bases in Central Asia, despite the domestic oppo-
sition. Russia was seen as an even closer ally than NATO.
The response of the US leadership was the softened
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referred to as the internal affair of the state.
When referring to the situation in Chechnya in 1994,
Yeltsin had stressed the need to rely strictly on negotiations
so as to reach a social and political consensus. The
consensus is aimed at a common goal of consolidating the
Russian state and increasing the welfare of its citizens
without regard to the differences in opinions and political
positions (Yeltsin, 1994). His 1995 State of the Nation
speech depicted a cooperative and conciliatory tone of
Russian foreign policy, in large part due to the widely
criticizedmilitary campaign in Chechnya. In 1995, he stated
that in rare cases when coercion is to be used all actions
need to conform to the will of the people, which is
enshrined in the Constitution (Yeltsin, 1995). He further
stated that Russia was compelled to use force against the
outlawed Chechen regime in the ﬁrst campaign that was
started against the backdrop of weak statehood, poor
condition of military forces, fragile civil society institutions,
and a still growing democracy when the government was
able not to suppress the wave of criticism and remain open,
both domestically and internationally (Yeltsin, 1995). In
1997, Yeltsin signed a peace treaty with Maskhadov to put
an end to hostilities between Russia and the Chechen
republic. Despite the war in Chechnya, Yeltsin was well
aware of the necessity to maintain a solid, business-like
relationship with the West, and was not about to forfeit
Russia’s right to fully participate in European and world
affairs. To alleviate the international criticism during the
height of the campaign, Yeltsin even allowed OSCE fact-
ﬁnding missions to enter Chechnya in an effort to resolve
the conﬂict. By permitting the OSCE to play an important
role in Chechnya, the Yeltsin administration attempted to
give evidence of its willingness to cooperate with interna-
tional organizations, notwithstanding the strong criticism
by the Republican-led US Congress.
In his 1994 State of the Nation address, Boris Yeltsin
stressed the need to enhance the dialog with the Chechen
authorities with the aim of holding democratic elections in
the breakaway republic (Yeltsin, 1994). He also said that:
without developed civil society institutions, state power
will inevitably become totalitarian and despotic. It is
because of civil society that this power serves the
interests of citizens. The distinction of the situation in
Russia is that parallel to building civil society institu-
tions, democratic foundations are being developed in so
far as a democratic society cannot exist without a civil
society. It is not about the interference of the state with
the life of the civil society structures and not about
equipping these organizations with executive powers,
but about a targeted assistance of those institutions that
are capable of consolidating the democratic potential of
the power (Yeltsin, 1994).
Vladimir Putin’s position on the Chechen question was
drastically different, which primarily derived from his ﬁrm
conviction that state collapse can be averted only by the
strengthened nationwide state control. Putin was able to
consolidate his rule in Chechnya following the major
offensive by the Russian army and a counter-insurgency
phase of the military campaign that was started inSeptember 1999. Putin’s rhetoric related to the war in
Chechnya and secessionism in general was obviously more
rigid and harsh in comparison to that of Yeltsin. In his May
2003 address, Putin stated that:
Russia will be a strong country with modern, well-
equipped, and mobile armed forces, with the army
prepared to protect its homeland and its allies, the
national interests of the country and its citizens. Our
history shows that a country like Russia will exist and
prosper only if it is a great power, yet in time of
economic or political crises there has always been
a threat of disintegration (Putin, 2003).
Putin took the problem of secessionism in Russia more
acutely. His ofﬁcial rhetoric associated with the Chechen
problem highlights the paramount necessity to suppress
the separatist movements by force of arms under the
pretext of the war against international terrorism and to
project a strong Russian inﬂuence across the entire North
Caucasus. Generally speaking, state-centrism was the most
salient feature of Russian foreign and domestic policies
under Putin. When he succeeded Yeltsin as President, the
policies of the state toward the Chechen republic and
secessionism in general took a more assertive form – that
is, despite Yeltsin’s initiation of a major offensive against
the Chechen separatists in December 1994, Putin’s
campaign against rebel ﬁghters appeared increasingly
uncompromising. This was, in part, due to the external
circumstances that dominated the global and post-Soviet
political space. Putin strove to link the struggle of the
Chechens for independence to a global terrorist threat and
Al-Qaida in order to achieve the support of the leading
democracies in his state-building campaign. The 9/11
attacks in New York and Washington and the subsequent
US-led military invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq have
proved to be a turning point in Putin’s anti-insurgency
campaign.
According to Richard Sakwa, “Putin’s image as an ‘iron
chancellor’ was created and sustained by his uncompro-
mising approach to the Chechen problem. His use of street
language in the press conference on 8 September, where he
used the underworld jargon of ‘soaking the bandits in the
John’, appeared at ﬁrst as if it would be a public relations
disaster, but in the event it only reinforced Putin’s image as
a man of the people” (Sakwa, 2008; p. 22).
Vladimir Putin’s rhetoric shows a tendency toward
increased state control and the use of coercive military
force against the separatist movement in Chechnya in an
effort to prevent the disintegration of the Russian state and,
more importantly, to consolidate the power base of the
ruling regime. Interestingly, Yeltsin had emphasized the
involvement and the signiﬁcance of democratic institu-
tions, civil society and negotiations in tackling ethnic
problems in his State of the Nation addresses. The First
Chechen campaign that was waged during Yeltsin’s presi-
dency was the result of the decision-making process
among the elite groups and individuals who often bypassed
the president’s approval of certain policies and avoided his
complete comprehension of critical issues. This is not to
suggest that it was launched without Yeltsin’s consent, yet
many political decisions during his rule can be attributed to
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his personal initiative. Yeltsin was forced to make unpop-
ular decisions because of the pressure exerted on him by
the oligarchy and individuals that were directly linked to
his family. Putin was able to overcome the inﬂuence of
various interest groups, suppress the impulses of power
elites in the decision- and policy-making processes and
impose his own will and convictions on the formation of
new domestic and foreign policies.
7. Terrorism
In the wake of the terrorist attacks in New York and
Washington in 2001, Putin offered the US leader his
country’s strong support in operations against Al-Qaida
bases in Afghanistan. This included intelligence coopera-
tion, opening Russian airspace for humanitarian aid ﬂights,
participation in rescue operations as well as compelling the
Central Asian leaders to provide support to US military
forces. Therewas logic behind these actions. In his February
2002 interview to Wall Street Journal, Putin expressed his
willingness to provide alternative energy market oppor-
tunities for the United States (Putin, 2002b). At that time,
Russia was the major oil producer, yet only one percent of
imported American oil had Russian origins. Putin antici-
pated an increase in the production of crude oil much of
which was intended for export, mostly to the United States.
Theoretically, this could put the United States in a position
of dependence on Russian oil supplies and create another
economic lever for Putin tomanipulate US foreign policy, as
was the case with EU-Russia partnership on energy issues.
Eager to engage the United States, Putin was careful not to
overly express his opposition on the long-standing issues,
such as the NMD, NATO expansion and the situation in the
former Yugoslavia. His decision to support the US invasion
of Afghanistan derived from the goal to oust the Taliban
regime and to replace it with the Russia-backed Northern
Alliance. However, while offering his support, Putin made it
clear that Russia will not engage in the military operations
because of the painstaking domestic and international
authorization process. In return for his support of the US
invasion of Afghanistan, he expected a US approval of his
policies in Chechnya and, possibly, accession to WTO.
When the GeorgeW. Bush administration announced its
plans to overthrow the Saddam Hussein regime in support
of a democratic Iraq, Russia responded in a different
manner. Putin decided to join the coalition of the opposing
countries. Not convinced by the US arguments about the
WMD threat, he was insisting on the broader UN involve-
ment, thereby asserting his disagreement with the US
leadership. The decision to oppose the US invasion was
driven by Russia’s economic and geo-political interests in
Iraq under Saddam Hussein’s regime and by the reluctance
to let US companies occupy the oil-rich country. At that
time, Russia was the main supplier of arms to Iraq and had
highly proﬁtable oil contracts with the Iraqi regime. In his
2003 State of the Nation address, Putin said: “Countries
with highly developed economies are around us. I must say
they push us aside from the lucrative world markets
whenever possible. Their visible economic advantages give
them the reason for geo-political ambitions” (Putin, 2003).However, in the end, his efforts to oppose the invasion of
Iraq werewasted and Russia could not use its veto power in
the Security Council because of the Bush administration’s
disregard for international normative standards, in favor
for unilateralism. In addition, Putin’s fears have not mate-
rialized and Russian companies have won a signiﬁcant
number of auction bids for oil development projects in Iraq.
8. Conclusion
The State of the Nation addresses of Yeltsin and Putin
examined in this essaysuggest that therewas a fundamental
shift in thinking from Yeltsin to Putin on the foreign policy
course of the Russian state. This is seen from the expressed
commitment to consolidate the bilateral cooperation with
theUS, todevelop civil society institutions and tobuild a free
market economy during Yeltsin’s presidency to a strong
political anddiplomatic oppositionbyPutinof all US-backed
security initiatives, military and economic coercion, the
centralization of executive power and thewillingness to use
military force in tackling political problems, both domesti-
cally and internationally. The shift is mainly manifest in the
rhetoric and policy actions of Putin and members of his
administration. Multiple factors can explain the difference
in foreign policy approaches of Yeltsin and Putin in the
context of US–Russian relations, such as different person-
alities, distinct socio-political circumstances that accom-
panied both leaders, distinct manners of speaking,
particular personal relationship chemistries and different
manners of reacting to US proposals. Most importantly,
however, the change of the foreignpolicy course can be seen
as a consequence of Putin’s strong personal conviction that
Russia’s global power image can be restored by means of
consolidation of coercive state power. Arousing the
nationalist agenda is one way of achieving that.
As was mentioned earlier, Boris Yeltsin was compelled
to make difﬁcult and unpopular decisions that were hardly
in line with his stated commitment to adhere to a liberal-
democratic course. However, many of his decisions were
the result of the political pressure that was exerted on him
by the oligarchy and senior administration ofﬁcials. Yelt-
sin’s poor health condition essentially undermined his
ability to fully engage in the decision-making process closer
to the end of his second term as president. He was preoc-
cupied with the necessity of ﬁnding a political successor
and ensuring the continuity of Russia’s foreign policy
course. Yeltsin anticipated a change of domestic and foreign
policies; however, at that time, he was mainly concerned
about the ability of his successor to handle the complex
situation inside the country and in the ever-changing
world. Throughout the span of Putin’s presidency, his
rhetoric on major political and economic affairs suggests
a heightened patriotic and nationalist stance. Despite the
many setbacks that followed Putin’s decisions, the Russian
society achieved a high degree of stability and consolida-
tion during his eight-year rule as president. Favorable
economic conditions – particularly, as a result of high oil
and gas prices on the world market and the revenues from
resource exports proved to be the stimulus for the Russian
leader to transform the system of governance and, along
with that, the entire concept of the Russian state security in
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Russian state interests in theWest and resulted in a relative
tension with the global security vision that was and
continues to be espoused by the US leadership and the
decision-makers within the US establishment.
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